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Abstract
Bell inequalities are a consequence of measurement incompatibil-
ity (not, as generally thought, of nonlocality). In classical terms, this
is equivalent to contextuality — measurement devices do have a sig-
nificant effect. Contextual models are reasonable in classical physics,
which always took the view that we ignore measurement devices when-
ever possible, but if that isn’t good enough then we do have to model
measurement devices. It is also argued that quantum theory should
only be taken with counterfactual seriousness, because measurement
incompatibility is a counterfactual concept.
1 introduction
The first part of this paper, section 2, addresses the violation of Bell in-
equalities, and shows that a classical contextual way of thinking about the
experiments is quite possible.
The second part, section 3, shows that more generally than for experi-
ments that violate Bell inequalities, the incompatibility of measurements is
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a result of a classically remarkable construction: even if an empirically ad-
equate classical noncontextual model of a measured system is not possible,
we nonetheless describe the measured system and a number of measurement
systems separately, using a quantum state and operators on a Hilbert space
to represent them.
Section 3 also argues that the idea of “incompatible measurements” de-
pends on a counterfactual relocation of measurements that are in fact com-
patible.
2 Bell inequalities
The data that comes from an experiment that violates Bell inequalities can be
summarized in a table with four columns, two for each arm of the experiment,
“A” and “a” for one arm and “B” and “b” for the other arm (see table 1).
Each A is an actual measurement result, and each a is an actual measurement
setting, and similarly for B and b. From these experimental results we can
construct statistics, but we’ll do the usual thing of assuming that we’ve taken
so many measurements that the statistics can be thought of in an idealized
way as probabilities. The experimental data can be summarized as a classical
probability distribution p(A, a, B, b).
A little closer to experiment would be two tables of data, “A”, “a”, and
“tA” for one arm (where tA is the time at which we observe A and a) and “B”,
“b”, and “tB” for the other arm (see table 1). To construct a table with just
A, a, B, and b, we look for times tA and tB that match within some tolerance,
and put the corresponding values of A, a, B, and b into our summary table.
To keep things simple, we’ll have to idealize again: a can take one of
only two values, a1 or a2; and b can take one of only two values, b1 or b2.
From the table of A, a, B, and b, which is a completely classical description
of the experimental results, we can select data that corresponds to each of
four possible cases, (a = a1, b = b1), (a = a1, b = b2), (a = a2, b = b1), and
(a = a2, b = b2), giving us four tables of actual data (see table 2), which in
an idealized description can be represented by four probability distributions,
p(A1, B1), p(A1, B2), p(A2, B1), and p(A2, B2).
Now it’s a simple fact[1] that we can’t always construct a probability
distribution p(A1, A2, B1, B2) that has p(A1, B1), p(A1, B2), p(A2, B1), and
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Selected by
Raw data: tA ≈ tB
[p(A,a,B,b)]
A a tA
...
a1
a2
a1
a1
a2
...
...
B b tB
...
b1
b1
b2
b2
b2
...
...
A a B b
...
a1
a2
a1
a1
a2
...
...
b1
b1
b2
b2
b2
...
Table 1: The raw experimental data, and the data selected
by approximately matching times of measurement.
Selected by Selected by Selected by Selected by
tA ≈ tB tA ≈ tB tA ≈ tB tA ≈ tB
a = a1 a = a1 a = a2 a = a2
b = b1 b = b2 b = b1 b = b2
[p(A1,B1)] [p(A1,B2)] [p(A2,B1)] [p(A2,B2)]
A1 B1
...
...
A1 B2
...
...
A2 B1
...
...
A2 B2
...
...
Table 2: The data selected according to measurement settings.
p(A2, B2) as marginal probability distributions, when these have been con-
structed by selection from our table of values of A, a, B, and b. This is often
held to make a classical description of the world impossible.
More careful accounts don’t say that. Here, it’s obvious that we’ve got a
perfectly good classical description, p(A, a, B, b), and the fact that we can’t
describe everything using a probability distribution like p(A1, A2, B1, B2) may
be awkward, but it’s not impossible. The technical difference between these
two probability distributions is that p(A1, A2, B1, B2) is a “non-contextual”
description, whereas p(A, a, B, b) is a “contextual” description, because by
including “a” and “b” we include information about the measurement appa-
ratus. Modern Physics usually insists that a contextual description is not
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OK, but all we have to do to let us think classically is to make sure that
any description of a Bell experiment is constructed to have p(A, a, B, b) as
a marginal probability distribution, not p(A1, A2, B1, B2) (which cannot be
empirically adequate). In other words, we have to remember that the exper-
imental apparatus will often have to be part of the model. This shouldn’t
worry us, because classical physics always took the view that we ignore the
experimental apparatus if we can, but if it isn’t good enough to do that then
we do also have to model the experimental apparatus.
What about nonlocality? Despite everything that’s been written about
nonlocality, it’s largely irrelevant: it’s contextuality that’s the main issue.
It’s an experimental fact so far that we can’t send messages faster than
light: p(A, a, B, b), in particular, is part of that experimental fact (satisfying
p(A|a, b) = p(A|a) and p(B|a, b) = p(B|b), which together ensure the neces-
sary statistical independence). A classical description of the world doesn’t
have to send messages faster than light, and mustn’t allow messages to be
sent faster than light, in models of existing experiments.
Nonetheless, there is a classical point of view from which the experimental
data p(A, a, B, b) does look strange. If we think there are classical particles,
for which there is an essentially unavoidable idea that they are separate
from one another, we will tend to get ourselves into the difficulties that are
usually associated with Bell inequalities (although there are what may be
called exotic loopholes). If we instead think in terms of classical fields, and
make sure there is no idea of separable particles, we won’t get ourselves in
those difficulties (in particular, see “The derivation of Bell inequalities for
beables”[2]). A classical theory will have to be a classical statistical theory,
and for a classical statistical theory to be good enough, it will have to be
a classical statistical field theory, just as for a quantum theory to be good
enough it has to be a quantum field theory. Quantum theory has a great
advantage here, because there are many interesting experiments where a
quantum field theory model can be reduced quite effectively to a model that
uses two or three quantum particles, or even a finite dimensional Hilbert
space, whereas for the same situation a classical statistical field theory model
can’t be reduced to as simple a model in terms of classical particles — wave
dynamics and interactions with measurement devices remain important.
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3 Incompatible measurements
Two assumptions are generally made in physical experiments. Firstly, suc-
cessive runs of an experimental apparatus are separated by sufficient time
for the results to be statistically independent. Secondly, if several appara-
tuses are used, they are separated by sufficient distance for the results to
be statistically independent. It is generally held to be a requirement of any
physical theory that the second assumption is satisfiable, which is codified
for quantum field theory as the cluster decomposition principle[3]. The first
assumption has been taken to be problematic in the foundations of classical
statistical mechanics, where it has been an aim to discover conditions on
which it can be proved that an ensemble of a single system considered at dif-
ferent times is equivalent to an ensemble of many systems in different places.
In practice, we seek to ensure that a number of runs of a single experimental
apparatus are empirically equivalent to having available to us a large number
of experimental apparatuses at quite large space-like separations from each
other.
Assume here, therefore, that we carry out an experiment using a set
of experimental apparatuses at quite large space-like separations from each
other. The measurements we make of these experimental apparatuses can
be tabulated (just as we tabulated the results of an experiment that violates
Bell inequalities in section 2), and we can again select results from the table
conditional on the measurement settings to give many tables, which we take
to be represented in quantum theory by noncommutative operators.
From a quantum field theoretical point of view, however, in a description
of the many experimental apparatuses that is as close as possible to experi-
mental detail, all the measurements correspond to mutually compatible op-
erators because they are measurements associated with regions of space-time
that are at space-like separation. The concept of incompatible observables
depends on the idea that actually measured compatible observables associ-
ated with space-like separated regions (or with time-like separated regions
that are far enough apart) would not have been compatible if they had been
measured in the same region. The measurements are incompatible only if we
take them to have been carried out in a single space-time region, when in
fact they clearly have not been. Although such a concept is mathematically
very useful, we do not have to take it to be fundamental.
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Quantum field theory is more empirically adequate than quantum par-
ticle theory, and we usually agree that a quantum field theory reduces to a
quantum particle theory in a suitable approximation, so our discussion will
be framed here in terms of quantum field theory. A quantum field theoretical
description of the whole set of experimental apparatuses is very underdeter-
mined by the measurements we make, simply because they are all compatible
measurements, as well as because we make only a finite number of measure-
ments. The set of candidate quantum field states that describe the whole
set of experimental apparatuses in fact must include quantum field states
that have a representation as a non-negative Wigner function (again just
because the measurements we make are mutually compatible; examples of
Wigner functions for quantum field states can be found in “A relativistic
variant of the Wigner function”[4]). A representation of a quantum field
state as a non-negative Wigner function can be regarded as a classical state.
Consequently, a classical contextual description of any experiment is entirely
possible (that is, an empirically adequate classical description of the mea-
surement systems and the measured systems together is possible whenever
an empirically adequate quantum field description of the measurement sys-
tems and the measured systems together is possible).
To obtain a quantum field state that is acted on by a number of incom-
patible observables as an alternative description of the whole set of experi-
mental apparatus, we have to identify a class of measurements that will be
termed “measurement settings” and a distinct class of measurements that
will be termed “measurement results”, as we did in section 2, to allow us
to construct a table of measurement results for each measurement setting.
Although this separation is possible and very useful, it is also arbitrary, an
arbitrariness corresponding to the notorious “Heisenberg cut”, and in general
the separation ignores the classical impossibility of a noncontextual model.
A detailed description of a measured system without considering its in-
teractions with a measurement system is not generally possible in classical
physics. We are of course very happy when a description of a measured sys-
tem alone is adequate, since reduced complexity is welcome, but classical
physics never required that this must be possible. We can present the possi-
bility of classical description without considering the whole of a measurement
apparatus as the possibility of constructing an empirically adequate quantum
state that has a representation as a non-negative Wigner function.
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In quantum theory, we seek to describe the interaction between a single
preparation device and many different measurement devices in a unified way.
• If we think classically and noncontextually, the preparation device pre-
pares the same classical field (or particle) state independently of what
measurement device is used. This is generally not empirically adequate.
• If we think quantum theoretically, the preparation device prepares the
same quantum state independently of what measurement device is used,
even if an empirically adequate classical noncontextual model is not
possible. This has been found to be empirically more adequate —
but we do have to consider the measurement device explicitly if we
want very great detail (for example, it may be significant that the
measurement device is not at absolute zero temperature; all non-ideal
properties will have to be considered eventually).
• If we think classically and contextually, the preparation device does not
prepare the same classical field state independently of what measure-
ment device is used. Although it is a shame to lose the effectiveness of
quantum theory for cases where we can adequately think of a quantum
state being independent of measurement devices, it may also be theo-
retically preferable to represent all the interactions of the preparation
device with the many different measurement devices in a unified way.
From the Copenhagen interpretation’s point of view, all description of
experiments is given in classical terms. We can only follow the Copenhagen
interpretation in its construction of a quantum state, however, if we make
a distinction between measurement settings and measurement results that
is in general not classically motivated. Although we can usefully make this
distinction, other approaches may also be useful, and more detailed classical
description of experiments is one possibility.
4 Conclusion
Although quantum theory is very useful, it rests on a counterfactual assump-
tion: we can carry out incompatible measurements. Although it is very effec-
tive to counterfactually relocate actual, compatible measurements (or very
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nearly compatible measurements if they are at large time-like separation) to
a common region of space-time, where they are, from the point of view of
quantum theory, incompatible, we are not justified in taking quantum theory
with more than counterfactual seriousness.
Also problematic is the separation of measurement devices from measured
systems, which quantum theory can do in its terms, even when classical
separation is not possible. Although this is very effective when it can be
done, it may be theoretically preferable to represent all the interactions of
measurement devices with measured systems in a unified way.
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